HomeMy WebLinkAboutChapter 602: Fireworks Regulations CITY OF CAPE CANAVERAL
105 POLK AVENUE • P.O. BOX 326
CAPE CANAVERAL, FL 32920
(407) 783.1100 DATE Feb. 23, 1989
FROM Sgt. George McGee SUBJECT Ordinance No. 1-89
Canaveral Precinct
Sheriff' s Dept.
111 Polk Avenue
Cape Canaveral, FL 32920
MESSAGE Attached please find a copy of Ordinance No. 1-89 which was adopted by the
City Council on February 21 and establishes Fireworks Regulations. Upon
the advice of the City Attorney, the Ordinance was amended to make it .
unlawful to ignite or explode the fireworks; he advised against prohibiting
the possession.
[Janet S. Leeser's signature]
SIGNED Janet S. Leeser, City Clerk
REPLY
SIGNED [illegible signature] DATE 3-1-89
RETURN THIS COPY TO SENDER
to be codified
codified Jan. 90
History File ORDINANCE NO. 1-89
AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF CAPE
CANAVERAL , BREVARD COUNTY, FLORIDA ,
ESTABLISHING CHAPTER 602 , FIREWORKS
REGULATIONS , OF THE CODE OF ORDI-
NANCES; REPEALING ALL PORTIONS OF THE
CODE IN CONFLICT HEREWITH; PROVIDING
AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
WHEREAS , it is the intent of the City of Cape Canaveral to
ban the ignition or explosion of fireworks and explosive
compounds as defined in Florida Statute 791. 01(4 ) (a) ; and
WHEREAS , it is for the benefit of the public safety and
welfare that such fireworks and explosive compounds be regulated;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council of the
City of Cape Canaveral, Brevard County, Florida, as follows:
SECTION 1. Chapter 602, Fireworks Regulations , of the Code
of Ordinances is hereby established as follows:
CHAPTER 602
FIREWORKS REGULATIONS
Sec. 602 . 01 Definitions . For the purposes of this
Chapter, the following words and phrases shall have the
following meanings:
Explosive Compounds means any chemical compound,
mixture, or device, the primary or common purpose of
which is to function by the substantially instantaneous
release of gas and heat.
Fireworks means and includes any combustible or
explosive composition or substance or combination of
substances or , except as herein after provided, any
article prepared for the purpose of producing a visible
or audible effect by combustion , explosion, deflagra-
tion or detonation. The term includes blank cartridges
and toy cannons in which explosives are used, the type
of balloons which require fire underneath to propel
them, firecrackers , torpedoes , skyrockets , roman
candles , dago boms , and any fireworks containing any
explosives or flammable compound or any tablets or
other device containing any explosive substance.
A. Fireworks does not include sparklers approved by
the Division of the State Fire Marshal of the Depart-
ment of Insurance pursuant to §791 . 013 ; toy pistols,
toy canes , toy guns , or other devices in which paper
caps containing twenty-five hundredths grains or less
of explosive compound are used, providing they are so
constructed that the hand cannot come in contact with
the cap when in place for the explosion; and toy pistol
paper caps which contain less than twenty hundredths
grains of explosive mixture, the sale and use of which
shall be permitted at all times.
B. Fireworks also does not include the following
novelties and trick noisemakers:
ORDINANCE NO. 1-89
PAGE 1 OF 3
1 . A snake or glow worm , which is a pressed
pellet of not more than 10 grams of pyrotechnic
composition that produces a large, snakelike ash
which expands in length as the pellet burns and that
does not contain mercuric thiocyanate.
2 . A smoke device, which is a tube or sphere
containing not more than 10 grams of pyrotechnic
composition that, upon burning , produces white or
colored smoke as the primary effect.
3 . A trick noisemaker, which is a device that
produces a small report intended to surprise the
user and which includes:
a. A party popper , which is a small plastic
or paper device containing not more than 16
milligrams of explosive composition that is
friction sensitive, which is ignited by pulling a
string protruding from the device, and which
expels a paper streamer and produces a small
report.
b. A booby trap, which is a small tube with
string protruding from both ends containing not
more than 16 milligrams of explosive compound,
which is ignited by pulling the ends of the
string, and which produces a small report.
c . A snapper, which is a small, paper-wrapped
device containing not more than four milligrams
of explosive composition coated on small bits of
sand, and which, when dropped, explodes , produc-
ing a small report. A snapper may not contain
more than 250 milligrams of total sand and
explosive composition.
d. A trick match , which is a kitchen or book
match which is coated with not more than 16
milligrams of explosive or pyrotechnic composi-
tion and which, upon ignition , produces a small
report or shower of sparks.
e. A cigarette load, which is a small wooden
peg that has been coated with not more than 16
milligrams of explosive composition and which
produces upon ignition of a cigarette containing
one of the pegs, a small report.
f . An auto burglar alarm, which is a tube
which contains not more than 10 grams of pyrotech-
nic composition that produces a loud whistle or
smoke when ignited and which is ignited by use of
a squib . A small quantity of explosive , not
exceeding 50 milligrams , may also be used to
produce a small report. [Ord. No. 1-89, §1, 21 Feb 89]
Sec. 602 . 03 Ignition or Explosion of Fireworks
Prohibited. It shall be unlawful to ignite or explode
any fireworks or explosive compound as defined in this
Chapter within the City limits of the City of Cape
Canaveral. [Ord. No. 1-89, §1, 21 Feb. 89]
Sec . 602 . 05 Exceptions . The provision of this
Chapter shall not apply to the City of Cape Canaveral ,
or its agents, when staging fireworks displays for the
enjoyment of the public. [Ord. No. 1-89, §1, 21 Feb 89]
ORDINANCE NO. 1-89
PAGE 2 OF 3
Sec. 602 . 07 Penalty. Any person violating any of
the provisions of this Chapter shall be punished as
provided in Section 801. 05. [Ord. No. 1-89, §1, 21 Feb 89]
SECTION 2 . All portions of the Code in conflict herewith
are hereby repealed.
SECTION 3 . This Ordinance shall take effect immediately
upon its adoption.
ADOPTED BY the City Council of the City of Cape Canaveral,
Florida, this 21st day of February , 1989.
[Joy C. Salamone's signature]
Mayor
ATTEST:
NAME YES NO
[Janet S. Leeser's signature]
City Clerk HOOG X
KIDD X
Approved as to Form: MILLER X
RANDELS X
SALAMONE X
[City Attorney's signature]
City Attorney
First Reading: 1-17-89
Posted: 1-19-89
Advertised: 1-26-89
Second Reading: 2-7-89
ORDINANCE NO. 1-89
PAGE 3 OF 3
History File Chapter 602
DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of The State of Florida, Appellant,
v.
ACME SPECIALTY CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Appellee.
No. 73-897.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 26, 1974.
The Circuit Court, Dade County, General Jurisdiction Division, David Popper,
J., entered judgement holding null and void the portions of a county ordinance banning the
sale of "sparklers," and county appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Barkdull, C.
J., held that portion of ordinance banning sale of sparklets was unconstitutional,
where sale of sparklets had been specifically approved by legislature of state.
Affirmed.
1. Counties [key symbol] 21 and a half
County ordinance banning the sale of "sparklers" was unconstitutional, where
sale of sparklets had been specifically approved by legislature of state, F.S.A. §
791.01.
2. Counties [key symbol] 55
County ordinances under home rule charter are to be treated the same as mu-
nicipal ordinances.
Stuart Simon, County Atty., and Steven Lee, Asst. County Atty., for appellant.
Ullman, Kimlet & Entin, Miami, for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.
BARKDULL, Chief Judge.
By this appeal, the County questions the correctness of a final judgement holding
null and void those portions of a County ordinance banning the sale of "sparklers".
Section 791.01, Fla. Stat.,[citation #1], F.S.A., defining fireworks, has a specific exemption as to
sparklets and provides in part that they may be offered for sale.
[1, 2] The Supreme Court of Florida has recently had occasion to review the
propriety of a municipality attempting to enact an ordinance prohibiting activities
authorized by a general State stature. Rinzler v. Carson, Fla.1972, 262 So.2d 661.
Examining the ordinance under attack in light of the cited stature, the sale of spar-
klers having been specifically approved by the Legislature of this State, we believe
the trial court was correct in the final judgement declaring so much of the Coun-
ty's fireworks ordinance[citation #2] which prohibits such sale to be unconstitutional.
Therefore, the final judgement here under review be and the same is hereby af-
firmed.
Affirmed.
1. "791.01 Fireworks defined
[5 bullet points]
"(2) The term 'fireworks' shall not include sparklers, toy pistols, toy canes, toy guns, or
other devices in which paper caps containing twenty-give hundredths grains or less of ex-
plosive compound are used, providing they are so constructed that the hand cannot come
in contact with the cap when in place for the explosion, and toy pistol paper caps which
contain less than twenty hundredths grains of explosive mixture, the sale and use of
which shall be permitted at all times."
2. County ordinances under Home Rule Charter are to be treated the same as municipal ordi-
nances. See: Applied Research Laboratories of Florida, Inc. v. Home, Fla.App.1971, 249
So.2d 732; Delano v. Dade County, Fla.1973, 287 So.2d 288.
City as, Fla.App., 292 So.2d 379
ACME SPECIALTY CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, a minicipal corporation, Appellee.
No. 73-938
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 26, 1974.
Plaintiff instituted suit whereby it attempted to be recielved from the prohibitory
features of a city ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within that municipality.
The Circuit Court, Dade County, General Jurisdiction Division, John Red Lake, J.,
entered judgement for city, and plaintiff appealed. The District Court of Appeal,
Barkdull, C. J., held that new suit whereby plaintiff sought to be relieved from prohib-
itory features of ordinance involved in earlier litigation had effect of an attempt to
be relieved of prior decision and mandate of District Court of Appeal, and was unau-
throized, thus requiring affirmance of final judgement in new suit but without prej-
udice to a reopening of original case for reliege from prohibitory features of final
decree in original case.
Affirmed without projudice.
1. Appeal and Error [key symbol] 1199
Order upholding ordinance and thereby prohibiting sale of sparklers within city
limits became judgement of District Court of Appeal on entry of mandate of that
court and was not subject to interference without specific permission of that court.
F.S.A. §§ 168.10, 791.01.
2. Courts [key symbol] 107
Per curian affirmance opinion of District Court of Appeal, with no reasons
or authorities given, did not stand for any
[page fades away here]
3. Municipal Corporations [key symbol] 591(1)
A municipality may not prohibit that which is specifically authorized by a gener-
al state statute. F.S.A. §§ 168.10, 791.01.
4. Appeal and Error [key symbol] 1199
New suit whereby plaintiff sought to be relieved from prohibitory features of
ordinance involved in earlier litigation had effect of an attempt to be relived of prior
decision and mandate of District Couty of Appeal, and was unauthorized, thus requir-
ing affirmance of final judgement in new suit but wuithout prejudice to a reopening
of original case for relief from prohibitory features of final decree in original case.
F.S.A. §§ 168.10, 791.01.
Ullman, Kimler & Entin, Miami, for appellant.
John S. Lloyd, City Atty., and S. R. Sterbenz, Asst. City Atty., for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.
BARKDULL, Chef Judge.
This case was argued as a companion to Dade County v. Acme Specialty Corpora-
tion, Fla.App., 292 So.2d 378, and involves the validity of a City of Miami ordinance
banning the sale of fireworks within that municipality.
The instant litigation was commenced subsequent to the Supreme Court's opinion
in Rinzler v. Carson, Fla.1972, 62 So.2d 661, the appellant contending that it was
specifically authorized to sell sparklers by the provisions of § 791.01, Fla.State., F.S.
A., and that the City, by ordinance, could not limit these sales. The City responded
that these identical parties had been in previous litigation in 1958, involving the same
statutes wherein the City's right, pursuant to § 168.10, Fla.State., F.S.A., to prohibit
[page fades away here]
[the top of the page is faded out]
Fla.App.1959, 110 So.2d 18. This case resulted in a per curiam affirmance without
opinion by this court, with a strong dissent. Certiorari was deined by the Supreme
Court, and the appellant refrained from selling within the City.
Thereafter, subsequent to the ruling in Rinzler v. Carson, supra, by the Supreme
Court of Florida, the appellant instituted the instant action in the trial court by a
new suit, attempting to be relieved from the prohibitory features of the same ordi-
nance which was involved in the earlier litigation. As indicated, it was unsuccessful
upon the plea of res judicata.
[1-3] We first note that the earlier case, resulting in an order upholding the
ordinance and thereby prohibiting the sale of sparklers within the city limits of the
City of Miami, became a judgement of this court upon the entry of the mandate of
this court, which was not subject to interference without the specific permission of
this court. Eisenburg v. Cornblum, 156 Fla. 702, 24 So.2d 236; Fairfax Broadcast-
ing Company v. Florida Airmotive, Inc., Fla.App.1971, 252 So.2d 854; Lesperance
[abrupt cutoff]
Dade County v. Acme Specialty Corporation, Fla.App.1974, 292 So.2d 378, and, if
necessary recede from the earlier opinion reported in Acme Specialties Corporation
v. City of Miami, Fla.App.1959, 110 So.2d 18. As noted before, this was a per cur-
iam opinion with no reasons or authorities given and, although this may be sufficient
to support a plea of res judicata as between the original parties, such per curiam
affirmance opinion does not stand for any general pronouncement of principles of law
that might have been urged by the parties in their pleadings and briefs.[citation #1] Further, it
appears that the Supreme Court, in the recent case of Rinzler v. Carson, supra, has
clearly stated that the law in this State today is that a municipality may not prohibit
that which is specifically authorized by a general State statute. Therefore, it would
appear that the appellant would have a good ground to believe that it should be re-
lieved of the prohibitory impact of the 1958 decree, which subsequently became a
judgement of this court by virtue of the appellate proceedings.
[4] However, although not raised by the appellee, we find that the independent
action taking by the appellant as a plaintiff in
[abrupt cutoff]
1: Compare Newmons v. Lake Worth Drainage District, Fla.1956, 87 So.2d 49, wherein the
following is found in part:
"The attribute of a per curiam, when the 'question presented is so clear that it is not considered necessary to elabo-
rate it by extended discussion,' may imply a variety of connotations.
It may be comploted to dispose of cases in which anything written on the points raised would
add nothing to the law. In fine, there is no limit to the grounds that may prompt a per curian opinion."
Schooley v. Judd, Fla.App.1963, 149 So.2d 587, wherein the following is found in part:
"In rendering the decree for the plaintiff, the chancellor stated that he relied on the
per curian decision of Hoffman v. Drennen, Fla.1956, 88 So.2d 624. This was a decision
without opinion affirming a decree. We are of the view that such a decision does not
establish any point of law; and there is no presumption that the affirmance was on the merits."
(This opinion was reversed on other grounds, without comment. See: Judd. v. Schooley,
Fla.1963, 158 So.2d 514.)
Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., Fla.1965, 177 So.2d 221, wherein the following is found in part:
"Nor can we escape that in common parlance, an affirmance without opinion of a
trial court by a district court is generall deemed to be an approval of the judgement
of the trial court, and becomes a precedent, certainly, in the trial court rendering the judgement."
[the following is the 2nd half of this page; the top of it is cut off]
the final judgement for the reason that the relief sought by the appellant as plaintiff
in the independent suit was not the proper way to attack the prior judgement. This
affirmance, however, shall be without prejudice to the appellant filing such pleadings
as it deemd necessary to reopen the original case the seek relief from the prohibitiry
features of that final decree, and it shall not be necessary for Acme Specialty
Corporation to seek any further permission of this court to do such or to file copies of
what it intends to present to the trial court ina na ttempt to be relieved
of the earlier injunction and the mandage of this court.
Affirmed without prejudice.
[large key symbol that says "WEST KEY NUMBER SYSTEM"]
DAVID AND DASH, INC., a corporation, Appellant,
v.
CAPITOL FIXTURE & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, a corporation,
Appellee.
No. 74-129
District Couty of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Aprol 2, 1974
Interlocutory appeal from decision of the Circuit Court, Dade County, General
Jurisdiction Division, Rhea P. Grossman, J., which denied defendant corporation's
motion to disqualify the trial judge for bias. The District Court of Appeal held
that motion to disqualify trial judge for bias was properly denied where no ground
or reason for disqualification was stated in the motion and the affidavit of the chair-
[abrupt cutoff]
Affirmed.
Judges [key symbol]51(3)
Motion to disqualify trial judge for bias was proper denied where no ground
or reason for disqualification was stated in the motion and the affidavit of the chair-
man of the board of the defendant corporation and the affidavits of two other offi-
cers of the defendant corporation were insufficient to show bias. F.S.A. § 38.10.
Marx & Squitero, Miami, for appellant.
Cushman & Cushman, Miami, for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and CARROLL, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This interlocutory appeal by the defendant challenges the correctness of an order
denying defendant's motion filed under § 38.10 Fla.Stat., F.S.A. to disqualify the
trial judge for bias. The motion was denied on the ground it was "insufficiant as
a matter of law." In so holding, the judge whose impartiality was challenged was cor-
rect. No ground or reason for seeking disqualification was stated in the motion,
which rlied upon three accompanying affidavits as stating factual support for the
motion. The affidavits were made by three officials of the defendant corpora-
tion. Assuming that the main affidavit (made by the Chairman of the Board of
the corporation) may be considered as the required affidavit of the moving party, and
without necessity to reach a decision as to whether the supporting affidavits of the
other officials of the defendant corporation would meet the requirement of the
statute which provides: "The said affida-
[abrupt cutoff]
STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER Bill Gunter
The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 STATE TREASURER
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
FIRE MARSHAL
October 10, 1988
Donald E. Highbarger, Fire Marshal
Cocoa Beach Fire Department
Post Office Box 320280
Cocoa Beach, Florida 32932-0280
Dear Fire Marshal Highbarger:
Your letter of September 22, 1988 to Mr. Steverson has been referred to me for
response.
Section 791.001, Florida Statutes provides that Chapter 791, Florida Statutes,
dealing with the sale of fireworks, shall be applied uniformly throughout the state.
Enforcement of this Chapter shall remain with the local law enforcement
departments and officials charged with the enforcement of the laws of the state.
Section 791.02(1), Florida Statutes provides that it is unlawful for any person,
firm, copartnership, or corporation to offer for sale, expose for sale, sell at retail, or
use or explode any fireworks. (Emphasis added) There are some exceptions to this
section dealing with the boards of county commissioners allowing public displays of
fireworks. These exceptions do not appear to be inquired of in your letter.
As to your specific question as to whether a municipality may make an
ordinance more stringent than the state law, this question has already been
answered by the courts. In Dade County v. Acme Specialty Corporation, 292 So. 2d
378 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974), the Court found that a county ordinance banning the sale
of"sparklers"was unconstitutional, where the sale of sparklers had been specifically
approved by the legislature of the state. in a companion case, Acme Specialty
Corporation v. City of Miami, 292 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974) the Court found
that a municipality may not prohibit that which is specifically authorized by a
general state statute.
It should be noted that the State Fire Marshal does not have jurisdiction over
municipal ordinances of the type described in your letter. You may wish to contact
the attorney for the City of Cocoa Beach for a definitive answer to your questions.
An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer
Donald E. Highbarger, Fire Marshal
October 10, 1988
Page two
I hope that the above fully addresses your concerns. Please do not hesitate to
contact me should you have any additional questions.
Sincerely,
[signature]
LISA S. SANTUCCI, ESQUIRE
Office of Legal Services
413-B Larson Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
(904) 488-7086
LS:lb
cc: Donald L. Steverson, Director
Division of State Fire Marshal
BREVARD COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
Titusville, Florida FILE COPY
MEMORANDUM
15 JUNE 1988
TO: CITY OF CAPE CANAVERAL
FROM : SERGEANT GEORGE McGEE
RE : ILLEGAL FIREWORKS
It is requested that the City of Cape. Canaveral consider
adopting an Ordnance to cover the possession of illegal
fireworks by persons within the city l i ri,.i t:. s , and to set an
age limit on the sale of approved fireworks .
At the present time , Florida S.S. 791.01 has no provisions
for the enforcement of the mere possession of illegal
fireworks , nor does it limit the age that a person may be
to purchase approved fireworks .
It is felt that, both areas need to he addressed for safety
and enforcement reasons .
[signature]
SERGEANT GEORGE McGEE , ID 186
GM/ssr
CLAUDE W. MILLER, SHERIFF
Chapter 602
Fireworks Regulations
OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREWORKS OR EXPLOSIVE COMPOUNDS
WHEREAS, it is the intent of the City of Cape Canaveral to ban the
ownership or possession of fireworks and explosive compounds as defined in
Florida Statute 791.01(4)(a) and further;
WHEREAS, it is for the benefit of the public safety and welfare that such
fireworks and explosive compounds be banned.
Definitions:
a." Explosive Compounds means any chemical compound, mixture, or
device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by the
substantially instantaneous release of gas and heat.
b. Fireworks' means and includes any combustible or explosive
composition or substance or combination of substances or, except as
hereinafter provided, any article prepared for the purpose of producing a visible
or audible effect by combustion,explosion,deflagration or detonation. The term
includes blank cartridges and toy cannons in which explosives are used, the
type of balloons which require fire underneath to propel them, firecrackers,
torpedoes, skyrockets, roman candles, dago bombs, and any fireworks
containing any explosives or flammable compound or any tablets or other
device containing any explosive substance.
b. " Fireworks'does not include sparklers approved by the division
pursuant to s.791.013;toy pistols,toy canes,toy guns,or other devices in which
paper caps containing twenty-five hundredths grains or less of explosive
compound are used, providing they are so constructed that the hand cannot
come in contact with the cap when in place for the explosion; and toy pistol
paper caps which contain less than twenty hundredths grains of explosive
mixture,the sale and use of which shall be permitted at all times.
c. Fireworks also does not include the following novelties and trick
noisemakers:
1. A snake or glow worm,which is a pressed pellet of not more than 10
grams of pyrotechnic composition that produces a large, snakelike ash which
expands in length as the pellet burns and that does not contain mercuric
thiocyanate.
2. A smoke device, which is a tube or sphere containing not more than
10 grams of pyrotechnic composition that, upon burning, produces white or
colored smoke as the primary effect.
3. A trick noisemaker, which is a device that produces a small report
intended to surprise the user and which includes:
a. A party popper,which is a small plastic or paper device containing not
more than 16 milligrams of explosive composition that is friction sensitive, which
is ignited by pulling a string protruding from the device, and which expels a
paper streamer and produces a small report.
b. A booby trap, which is a small tube with a string protruding from both
ends containing not more than 16 milligrams of explosive compound, which is
ignited by pulling the ends of the string,and which produces a small report.
c. A snapper, which is a small, paper-wrapped device containing not
more than four milligrams of explosive composition coated on small bits of sand,
and which,when dropped, explodes, producing a small report. A snapper may
not contain more than 250 milligrams of total sand and explosive composition.
d. A trick match, which is a kitchen or book match which is coated with
not more than 16 milligrams of explosive or pyrotechnic composition and which,
upon ignition, produces a small report or shower of sparks.
e. A cigarette load, which is a small wooden peg that has been coated
with not more than 16 milligrams of explosive composition and which produces,
upon ignition of a cigarette containing one of the pegs, a small report.
f. An auto burglar alarm,which is a tube which contains not more than 10
grams of pyrotechnic composition that produces a loud whistle or smoke when
ignited and which is ignited by use of a squib. A small quantity of explosive, not
exceeding 50 milligrams, may also be used to produce a small report.
2. It shall be unlawful to own or possess any firework or explosive
compound as defined in this Ordinance
3. Penalties: Anyone violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor of the same degree and be punishable by a fine not to
exceed $500.00 and a period of incarceration no to exceed 60 days in the
Brevard County Jail.
4. THIS ORDINANCE SHALL NOT APPLY TO THE CITY, OR ITS
AGENTS WHEN STAGING HOLIDAY FIREWORKS DISPLAYS FOR THE
PUBLIC ENJOYMENT.
BREVARD COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
Titusville, Florida FILE COPY
MEMORANDUM
15 JUNE 1988
TO: CITY OF CAPE CANAVERAL
FROM : SERGEANT GEORGE McGEE
RE : ILLEGAL FIREWORKS
It is requested that the City of Cape. Canaveral consider
adopting an Ordnance to cover the possession of illegal
fireworks by persons within the city l i ri,.i t:. s , and to set an
age limit on the sale of approved fireworks .
At the present time , Florida S.S. 791.01 has no provisions
for the enforcement of the mere possession of illegal
fireworks , nor does it limit the age that a person may be
to purchase approved fireworks .
It is felt that, both areas need to he addressed for safety
and enforcement reasons .
[signature]
SERGEANT GEORGE McGEE , ID 186
GM/ssr
CLAUDE W. MILLER, SHERIFF